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TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL EAST-WEST
TRADE POLICY
Adi E. Stevenson*
Each Presidential administration promises to articulate a policy on
East-West trade. Each is torn between the demands of mercantilists for
markets and hard liners for security. The United States ends up sacri-
ficing both its trade and security interests, and still has no coherent
policy on East-West trade.'
"East-West trade" is shorthand for trade with communist countries.
In the parlance of American foreign policy, communist countries are
segregated and referred to as "non-market" countries.2 The United
States views the world as bipolar, divided into two hostile camps by
geography and ideology.
The rationale for the segregation of communist countries is the
Marxist doctrine of world struggle and the eventual supremacy of com-
munism.3 But there is little historical support for this rationale. The
proletariats of the world have shown little appetite for communism as it
is practiced today. "Wars of Liberation," by whatever name, are un-
guided by ideology. They are more likely to be motivated by aspira-
tions for bread and freedom than by ideologies of capitalism or
communism. Small communist countries, such as Bulgaria, pose little
threat to the United States, even as members of the Warsaw Pact.4
Some non-communist nations are more hostile and more powerful than
many communist nations.5
Judging from the current law, the overriding objective of United
States East-West trade policy is free emigration.6 Access by communist
* On leave of absence from the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois and Wash-
ington, D.C. Mr. Stevenson served as United States Senator from Illinois from 1970 to 1981.
While in the Senate, Mr. Stevenson chaired the Subcommittee on International Finance, the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, and the Subcommittee on Oil and Gas
Production. Mr. Stevenson has also served as a law clerk to Justice Walter Schaefer of the
Illinois Supreme Court and as a member of the Illinois House of Representatives. A.B.,
Harvard College, 1952; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1957.
1. See Parsons, Recent Developments In East-West Trade: The U.S. Perspective, in EAST-WEST
TRADE 158, 159 (K. Grzybowski ed. 1972, 1973).
2. F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOWSKY, INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 3
(1979). These "non-market" countries are also referred to as "planned economy" countries.
3. See J. PUBANTZ, Afarxism-Leninism and Soviet-American Economic Relations Since Stalin, in
EAST-WEST TRADE 145 (K. Grzybowski ed. 1972, 1973).
4. Brady, Trade With the Eastern Bloc, 48 VIT. SPEECHES DAY 56 (1981).
5. A list of aggressive, non-communist countries might include Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
6. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, tit. IV, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2101
et seq.), § 402, Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade. § 402(a) sets out the law and
policy of denying most-favored-nation treatment to nonmarket economy countries. Subsec-
tion (b) describes the procedure by which a country previously falling under clause (a) classi-
fication may regain most-favored nation treatment and other trade advantages. Subsection
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countries to our markets and to official United States trade credits is
conditioned upon the right of their citizens to emigrate.7 This objective
reflects a concern for the plight of Jewry in the Soviet Union that is not
reflected in policy toward non-communist countries, nor in our own
immigration policies. Haitians wash up on our shores like human flot-
sam, but are not the stated object of official solicitude.' United States
policy now is reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of non-commu-
nist oppression.
The objective of East-West trade policy is not in fact free emigra-
tion. The Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China made that
point when he asked Mr. Carter, "how many million do you want?"9
The ostensible beneficiaries of our official solicitude in the Soviet
Union pay a high price for it. Their emigration falls off when the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment is passed by the House of Representatives. 10
Emigration from the Soviet Union increases with the pendency of
SALT II.11 It slumps again when SALT II is abandoned and the pipe-
line sanctions are imposed.' 2
The objective of East-West trade policy is not trade. Its real objec-
tive is to punish the Soviet Union for its transgressions, most recently in
Afghanistan and Poland, and retard its economic and military develop-
ment.'3 The result of East-West trade policy is to achieve neither its
(c) describes the President's authority to waive subsection (a) and (b) with respect to any
country.
7. See id.
8. In the latter part of 1979, thousands of Haitians journeyed to Florida to escape the repressive
regime of the Duvalier family (President Jean-Claude Duvalier). The United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarded them as illegal immigrants looking for
jobs, and sought to deport them. These Haitians did not qualify as refugees from commu-
nist-dominated countries under federal law which allowed 17,400 annually at that time.
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 2, 1979, at 37.
9. On January 28, 1979, Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping arrived in Washington to
begin a nine day visit in the United States aimed at solidifying U.S.-Chinese diplomatic
relations which had just been established on January 1. On January 31, President Carter and
Deputy Premier Teng signed agreements for cultural and scientific exchanges, including an
agreement establishing United States consulates in Shanghai and Canton and Chinese con-
sulates in Houston and San Francisco and provisions for reuniting families. See 15 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 200-12 (Feb. 5, 1979).
10. The Jackson-Vanik amendment refers to the emigration requirements of Section 402 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1976). See 4mending the Export-Import Bank Act and
the Trade Act: Hearing before the Subcomnin on International Finance of the Comm on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-422
(1979) (statement of Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, chairman of the subcommittee) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings before the Subconanm on International Finance]. Documents entered into
the record at that hearing indicate that Soviet Jewish emigration decreased in 1974 by 38.2%
and in 1975 by 35.7% (both as percentage changes from prior year).
11. Id. These documents indicate that Soviet Jewish emigration increased substantially in 1978
(up 73.1%) and projected to increase in 1979 (up 73.2%).
12. Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter requested Congress to delay
consideration of the SALT II Treaty on January 3, 1980. Letter to the Majority Leader of
the Senate Requesting a Delay in Senate Consideration of the [SALT I] Treaty, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 12 (Jan. 7, 1980). In 1980, Soviet Jewish emigration declined sharply
from a record high in 1979. The monthly rate dropped from 4,800 in October 1979 to 2,000
in April 1980. FAcTs ON FILE 467 (1980).
13. Brady, supra note 4.
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ostensible or its actual objectives. 4 Trade, which is strangely absent
from considerations of East-West trade policy, also suffers.
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NORMALIZATION OF
EAST-WEST TRADE
American diplomacy should reflect the realities of this world, in-
cluding its new pluralism. The pluralism of the communist world is
manifested by events in Poland, 5 the internal tensions of Yugoslavia,
16
the experiment with decentralization in Hungary,'7 the independent
foreign policy of Rumania,' a grim three way conflict in Cambodia,'
and the overarching tension between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China.
The United States would, with more wisdom, normalize trade with
Eastern European countries, weaning them from dependence on the
Soviet Union.20 By denying them trade"l we force their dependence on
14. See United States- Western European Relations in 1980: Hearings Before the Subcornmm on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Comn. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 32
(1980) (statement of Simon H. Serfatz, Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re-
search, Johns Hopkins University) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Western Europe].
Mr. Serfatz pointed out that the European community believes the United States "pun-
ishment" of the Soviet Union may harm the ally more than the adversary.
15. The movement for greater Polish independence in political, social, and economic arenas mo-
tivated the labor unrest in recent years. This culminated in the Gdansk Accords of 1980, in
which the existence of independent, self-governing trade unions was formally recognized.
FACTS ON FILE 657 (1980).
More recently, the continued influence of the Catholic Church, ongoing labor unrest, and
the imposition of martial law evidence the problems of Russian control over Poland.
16. In the spring of 1981, university students and professors, journalists and officials were purged
from the Communist party after protests demanding that the Kosovo province in southern
Yugoslavia, be given republic status in the Yugoslavia federation. The Yugoslav Central
Committee eventually ousted Kosovo party leader Mahmut Bakalli and the provincial presi-
dent. FACTS ON FILE 429, 998 (1981).
17. The new private enterprise law, effective January 1, 1982, represents another step towards
decentralization of Hungary's planned economy. The law provides for the following: Hun-
garian citizens can form private companies with as many as 30 employees; major state-
owned farms can form privately owned subsidiaries that participate in profit sharing with the
parent companies; five firms can combine into a private cooperative venture of up to 150
employees, and all new private firms would be eligible for venture capital loans. FACTs ON
FrE 756 (1981).
18. At a meeting of communist nations on February 6, 1980, held in Bulgaria, Rumania joined
North Korea in refusing to sign a statement endorsing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Rumania further asserted its independence from Moscow by signing an agreement calling
for the negotiation of bilateral contracts with the European community. FACTS ON FILE 109
(1980).
19. Southeast Asia has been embroiled in a three-way conflict involving the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia (1978-79) and Thailand (June 1980). FACTS ON FILE 508 (1980).
20. F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, supra note 2, at 100. In their chapter entitled "Economic
Policy and Industrial East-West Cooperation," the authors synthesized the following from
empirical data:
It may be assumed that as East-West relations expand, the share of intra-CMEA
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) trade will continue to decline, or at best
remain stable.
21. Parsons, supra note 1, at 161. The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, which was founded to
help finance imports and exports, was amended by the Export Expansion Finance Act of
1971 to provide greater potential for increased export commerce. However, political pres-
sures intervened.
In the mid-sixties, the Bank was prohibited from granting credit for the sale or lease
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the Soviet Union and a closed, inhibiting system of barter within the
COMECON countries.22 Mutual interest in each other's welfare and
profit comes with trade.23 If our notions about capitalism and free en-
terprise are right, these nations will, within limits made larger by trade,
work their way toward us. No nation seeks Soviet bondage. All have a
uniqueness and some pride in their national identity. Poland, which
has enjoyed the closest commercial relations with the West,24 exper-
iences the most visible struggle for human rights and national indepen-
dence. Even compliant Bulgaria, emancipated from Turkish bondage
by Soviet arms, is experimenting with new methods of decentralized
decision-making in its economic system. 5
A differentiated approach to the communist nations might produce
more caution in some parts and improved relations through trade in
others. The passion for trade with the People's Republic of China,
even in weapons and equipment with potential military uses, betrays
more confidence in the ultimate good will of a billion armed and disci-
plined communist Chinese than history warrants. The United States
tilted toward the PRC in an attempt to taunt the Soviet Union26 and
gave little thought to the implications. Japan and the other allied na-
of goods to a communist country or if the goods were known to be ultimately destined
for use in a communist country, unless the President determined the transaction was
in the national interest. A further blow was dealt to East-West trade in 1968 when the
Bank was absolutely prohibited from extending credit to any country which traded
with a country in armed conflict with the United States. This provision had the prac-
tical effect of preventing the Bank from participating in the financing of exports to
any communist country.
Id.
22. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), or more commonly, COMECON, was
formed in 1949 essentially to aid in the development of its member socialist countries
through economic integration and mutual aid among its membership. See I A.J. PEASLEE,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 332 (1956). New Statutes of the Council
were adopted in 1959. 368 U.N.T.S. 253. COMECON countries include the USSR, Bulga-
ria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Outer Mongolia and Cuba.
23. F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, supra note 2, at 16.
24. Sadowski, The Law of Foreign Trade in the Polish People's Republic, in EAsT-WEST TRADE
114 (K. Grzybowski ed. 1972, 1973).
Poland's commercial relation with the West was rebuilt after W.W. II on the basis of
existing commercial treaties and conventions, protocols, and other agreements which she had
negotiated between 1918 and 1939. For example, American-Polish trade relations were re-
established by the agreement of April 24, 1946, in which Poland agreed to effect the goals of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the U.S. and Poland. Id.
at 138.
25. Sipkov, he Law of Foreign Trade in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in EAST-WEST TRADE
96 (K. Grzybowski ed. 1972, 1973).
The doctrine that foreign trade monopoly is a sovereign function of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria does not, however, mean that the State assumes the role of a
merchant, that it itself engages in foreign trade activities. The State does not act in
the capacity of a trader but it effectuates foreign trade transactions through govern-
ment economic enterprises, the rights and responsibilities of which are defined by the
Council of Ministers. Thus, the development of the country's international commerce
is entrusted to special foreign trade organizations (vunsbnoturgovski organizatsii)
which are selected from among the various government economic combines, enter-
prises, societies, cooperatives, and the like.
26. The normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Re-
public of China began on January 1, 1979. On July 7, 1979, the two countries signed the
Agreement on Trade Relations, which laid the basis for normalized trade between the two
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tions are less impulsive and more wary of involving themselves in the
conflict between the communist super powers. They maintain an
"evenhanded" policy27 to which the United States subscribed until
Afghanistan.28
With the discovery that a Soviet brigade in Cuba was organized
along combat lines29 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,30 the
United States overreacted.3 1  With the 1980 elections looming, Con-
gress panicked. The United States played out all the non-military op-
tions.3 2 The United States left itself with little but military force or
acquiescence for the next time the Soviet Union transgressed its sensi-
bilities. Now we are building up the military.33 We scrapped Salt I13
and imposed economic sanctions,35 punishing ourselves, 36 as well as the
Soviets for their transgressions.37  We tilted toward the PRC.38  We
countries. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.-
CHINA COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, A COMPILATION OF BASIC DOCUMENTS (1982).
27. Kitagawa, Lega/Aspects of Soviet-Japanese Trade, in EAST-WEST TRADE 169 (K. Grzybow-
ski ed. 1972, 1973). "The most-favored-nation clause is a keystone of Soviet-Japanese trade.
In contrast with the U.S. policy regarding the clause and Soviet trade, Soviet-Japanese trade
was marked by the reciprocal recognition of this clause to the fullest extent from the very
beginning of the resumption of trade after W.W. II."
28. Memoranda From the President, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 32, 33 (Jan. 7, 1980). On
January 7, 1980, President Carter ordered an embargo on wheat and corn exports to the
Soviet Union. On January 8, President Carter directed the Secretary of Commerce to review
and revise the U.S. policy regarding the export of high technology and other strategic items
to the Soviet Union and ordered that no validated export licenses for shipment of goods or
technical data to the Soviet Union be approved until review was complete.
29. President's Remarks to Reporters, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1602 (Sept. 7, 1979). In
late August 1979, the Carter Administration announced that intelligence reports indicated
that a Soviet combat brigade of about 2,000 to 3,000 troops were stationed in Cuba.
30. On December 27, 1979, President Haflzullah Amin of Afghanistan was ousted in a coup
reportedly engineered by the Soviet Union. His overthrow had been preceded and was fol-
lowed by airlifting thousands of Soviet troops across the border into Afghanistan. By De-
cember 29, U.S. officials estimated that the invading troops numbered more than 30,000 men.
FACTS ON FILE 973 (1979).
31. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Retaliatory actions by the
United States government included: (1) the suspension of agricultural exports, (2) the restric-
tion of Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters, (3) the United States boycott of the 1980
Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, and (4) restrictions on exporting high technology and
other strategic items to the Soviet Union. See 126 CONG. REC. S 363 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1980).
32. See id.
33. The Reagan Administration issued a report entitled "Program for Economic Recovery" on
February 18, 1981, which indicated that defense spending would increase from $157.9 billion
in 1981 to a projected outlay of $249.8 billion in 1984. As a proportion of the total federal
budget, this represents an increase from 24.1% in 1981 to 32.4% in 1984. White House Re-
port, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 145 (Feb. 18, 1981).
34. See Statement by the White House Press Secretary and Letter to the Majority Leader of the
Senate, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 12 (Jan. 3, 1980). On January 3, 1980, President
Carter requested Congress to delay its consideration of the Salt II Treaty until both he and
Congress could assess Soviet actions and intentions involving the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
35. See supra note 31.
36. There was widespread skepticism, particularly among our European allies, about the effec-
tiveness of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. See Hearings on Western Europe,
supra note 14, at 68-154 (preface by Lee A. Hamilton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Europe and
the Middle East).
37. See supra note 31.
38. See supra note 28. On July 7, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States
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boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics. 39 The Reagan Administration
lifted the grain embargo4° and inconsistently imposed the pipeline
sanctions.41 We revived the Cold War. The Carter and Reagan Ad-
ministrations put us back, more or less, where we were after the upris-
ings in Czechoslovakia and Hungary:42 powerless to help the victims
of Soviet aggression and, in the eyes of the world, powerless to do any-
thing convincingly, and in concert with our Allies, when the Soviets
transgress our interests.
The Reagan administration, with its militancy and coolness to ne-
gotiations for arms limitations,43 made Mr. Brezhnev appear to be the
peacemaker.' People by the hundreds of thousands have filled the
streets of Europe to protest.45  Friendly European governments have
been shaken.4 6 Increased expenditures for defense were cut back in
Europe,47 and never materialized in Japan.48 The gas pipeline sanc-
tions increased tensions between the Allies. Now we arguably negoti-
signed the Agreement on Trade Relations. During the last half of the 1970s, United States
trade with the People's Republic of China increased dramatically. Brady, supra note 4.
39. White House Statement on U.S. Withdrawal From the Games To Be Held in Moscow, 16
WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 356 (Feb. 20, 1980).
40. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the 15 month old embargo on sales to the Soviet
Union. Memorandum to the Secretary of Agriculture, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 466
(Apr. 27, 1981).
41. In August 1982, trade sanctions were imposed on companies violating the U.S. embargo on
sales of any U.S.-developed technology for use in the Soviet-Western European natural gas
pipeline. On September 1, 1982, the United States government reduced the scope of sane-
tons imposed in connection with the pipeline. The modified sanctions would bar companies
only from buying oil and gas equipment from the United States. See 128 CONG. REC. S
11140 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1981).
42. In October 1956, the Soviet Union extinguished a large-scale revolt in Budapest, Hungary.
In August 1968, the Soviets overran Czechoslovakia encountering little resistance. These
events lead to strained relations with the Soviet Union during those years. T.A. BAILEY, A
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 837, 916 (1970).
43. See The President's News Conference of January 29, 1981, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
64, 66 (Jan. 29, 1981). Also, on March 26, 1981, President Reagan warned the Soviet Union
that any intervention in Poland or any internal measures "aimed at suppressing the Polish
people" would have a "grave effect on the whole course of East-West relations." FACTS ON
FILE 186 (1981).
On March 21, 1981, National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen warned that Western
Europe was threatened internally by "outright pacifist sentiments" and a "grave economic
crisis." Allen asserted that the U.S. would not accept arms control negotiations, which many
Europeans supported, as a substitute for the modernization of NATO's missile forces in Eu-
rope. FACTS ON FILE 189 (1981).
44. Remarks at a White House Briefing, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 182 (Feb. 24, 1981). In
February 1981, President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union suggested a summit meeting for the
USSR and the United States.
45. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstrations in a number of European cities
on October 24 and 25 to call for nuclear disarmament and protest plans by NATO to display
new medium-range nuclear weapons. FACTS ON FILE 789 (1981). See also ISSUES IN RELA-
TIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, FALL 1981: REPORT OF A
STUDY MISSION TO WESTERN EUROPE, NOVEMBER 4-13, 1981, TO THE HOUSE COMMITrEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 32, 88-93 (1982) (Findings, Clement J.
Zablocki, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
46. Id. at 2, 11.
47. For example, West Germany announced that the proportion of the national budget allocated
to military spending would decline from 18% to 16% by 1984. FACTS ON FILE 181 (1981).
48. Although the Japanese National Defense Council announced a five year program for in-
creasing Japan's defense capabilities, on July 23, 1982, Japanese Premier Zenko Suzuki de-
clared a fiscal state of emergency on September 16, 1982, indicating that the government
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ate from greater weakness for the reduction of arms, the Reagan
Administration's defense build up notwithstanding. The Soviets are
encouraged to compromise their differences with the PRC.
Six years ago the United States subsidized Soviet wheat
purchases.49 In one year, during the heyday of detente, the United
States offered the Soviets $500 million in credits for the purchase of
non-agricultural commodities." At Helsinki, the United States offered
the Soviets the Western imprimatur of approval for Soviet domination
in Eastern Europe in exchange for lip service to human rights." No
sooner were credits extended than the game of linkage began.52 The
Soviets were denied access to official credits and United States markets
upon "most favored nations" terms.53 When we discovered the brigade
in Cuba and scrubbed SALT II,14 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
55
They had little to lose by their aggression and perhaps something to
gain. The force levels of the West were irrelevant then, as they were in
Angola. 6 We lurch from one extreme to another, from one Adminis-
tration to the next, rarely basing policy on realities.
would have to reduce spending on education, welfare, national security, and overseas aid.
FACTS ON FILE 553 (1982).
49. United States-Soviet Grain Agreement, S. 2492 and Other Matters: Hearings Before the Sub-
com on Internat'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 30-31 (1976) (Statement of Robert G. Lewis, national secretary, Na-
tional Farmers Union).
50. THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLl-
CIES, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 25 (1974).
51. On July 30, 1975, the largest summit conference in European history convened in Helsinki,
Finland, for the signing of the "final document" of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe. This document, subject to numerous re-drafting, expressed principles
for reassuring a permanent peace in Europe, for cooperation between nations and for estab-
lishing inviolable boundaries within the continent. This was the culmination of the long
Soviet effort to gain recognition of the permanence of post-war boundaries in Europe. After
much debate, the final draft made no explicit mention of human rights. Conference on Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in Ir'L LEGAL
MAT'Is 1292 (1975).
Ronald Reagan commented in the same vein as the author. When Reagan was
campaigning for the Republican Presidential nomination in April 1976, he charged that
President Ford's signing of the Helsinki pact was putting an American "stamp of approval
on Russia's enslavement of the captive nations." FACTS ON FILE 232 (1976).
52. "Linkage" refers to the United States foreign policy strategy of connecting economic rela-
tions with political behavior. The concept of linkage has evolved from its original use by the
Nixon Administration to a modified form by the Carter Administration which implemented
linkage in a broader human rights context. See Hearings on Westrn Europe, supra note 14, at
78, 121 (statement by Richard 
D. Erb).
53. Because of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, supra note 10, the U.S. had never fulfilled a 1973
promise to normalize trade relations with the Soviets by granting them most-favored-nation
status and access to credit from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. FACTS ON FILE 834 (1979).
54. See supra notes 12 and 29.
55. See supra note 30.
56. In January 1975, Portugal formed a transitional government in Angola that would rule until
the Portugese territory acceded to independence in November. Struggling for eventual con-
trol of the government were three liberation groups: the MPLA (the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola), a Marxist-oriented group backed by the Soviet Union; the FNLA
(the National Front for the Liberation of Angola); and UNITA (the National Union for the
Independence of Angola). The latter two were considered pro-Western and were supported
by U.S. aid (amounting to $60 million in 1975). On July 15, 1975, the Soviet-backed MPLA
took control of the Angolan capital city of Luanda. FACTS ON FILE 440, 516, 614, 993 (1975).
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In this post-colonial world, conflicts are animated by religious fun-
damentalism, nationalistic movements, and the unpopularity of repres-
sive regimes. The limits of military power were dramatized by the
Americans in Vietnam, as well as by the Soviets in Afghanistan. We
live in a transistorized world in which politicized masses, unperturbed
by foreign force levels or economic sanctions, exercise power at the ex-
pense of government and elites. Even Cuba, ninety miles off our
shores, is unimpressed by economic sanctions s7
The Realities of our World Include Russia
Russian imperialism did not begin in Afghanistan. It began a thou-
sand years ago. In 1917 it acquired an ideological cover.58 The totali-
tarian state was perfected. Communist Russia's march continued and
it is not likely to be arrested by the granting or withholding of credits or
access to our markets 9.5  The Soviet Union is animated by invasions
from the Tartars to the Nazis, by its encirclement in the Cold War, by
the imperialism of Peter and Catherine, by the communism of Marx
and Lenin.6" Its history gives us some basis for caution. Without some
evidence of resolve and reliability in the West or some possibility for
the peaceful and mutually advantageous accommodation of differ-
ences, the Soviet Union will be tempted to press its opportunities in the
world. It will be even more tempted for reasons of ideology, as well as
opportunism, if the economic systems of the West come apart and the
social cohesion of Western nations is strained by poverty and economic
injustice. The greatest threat to our security may be from within and
the conditions paradoxically created by our reliance on armaments
and, to a lesser extent, economic sanctions in dealing with the Soviet
Union. Those nations which produce the most efficiently and market
their goods and services the most aggressively enjoy the highest levels
of economic growth and employment and the lowest levels of inflation;
they tend to be the nations which spend the least on armaments.61
They go all out to win the new world war for the world's markets and
supplies, uninhibited by the constraints of United States East-West
trade policy.
62
Soviet adventurism could be resisted by nations which are economi-
57. In July 1964, the Organization of American States (except Mexico) voted to impose eco-
nomic sanctions on Cuba and to prohibit all OAS members from official relations with Ha-
vana. T.A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 894 (1970).
58. In March 1917, a Russian revolution overthrew the Czarist regime. Id. at 594.
59. Post-World War I developments during the height of the Cold War indicated that Soviet
expansionism continued regardless of United States trade policy.
60. R. HILSMAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY MAKING IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 152
(1971).
61. Export Expansion Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Com-
merce and Tourism of the Senate Conm on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 275 (1972)
(statement of Bruce W. Rohrbacker, Director, McKinsey & Co.) [hereinafter cited as Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism].
62. See id.
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cally strong, united in purpose, and attuned to the realities of a world
little impressed by MX Missiles and frozen assets. Any level of mili-
tary strength which conveys an impression of irresolution or retreat is
unsafe against the history of Soviet expansionism.63 But, perceptions
of adequacy vary. Resistance can take many forms. The Soviet Union
is generally influenced more by mixed prospects for trade and eco-
nomic development than by prospects for warfare, undiluted by pos-
sibilities for peaceful progress on any front. That which powers may be
persuaded to do by old-fashioned, and now neglected, methods of quiet
diplomacy can be made more unlikely when national pride is
threatened. The grain embargo' hardened the Soviet position.65
Actions such as the freeze of Iranian assets, 66 once taken, are diffi-
cult to undo.67 Embargoes, like the freezing of assets, are economic
acts of war.68 Recently, such acts have ended in American capitula-
tion.69 President Reagan lifted the grain embargo unilaterally;7" the
Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan.71 Soviet influence in Poland
was undiminished. The pipeline sanctions were lifted for a European
fig leaf.72 One mistake is compounded by another. Such inconsisten-
cies and political expediencies dismay friends and bewilder enemies.73
The cost of the grain embargo included $1.4 billion for the purchase
of grain destined for the Soviet Union.74 Public expenditures for price
63. See Proposed Legislation to Establish an Office ofStrategic Trade: Hearings on S. 2606 Be/ore
the Senate Comnz on Governmental 4ffairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1980) (testimony of the
Sen. Jake Garn, R-Utah). The Hon. Garn states, "History will show it was during this so-
called period of detente that the Soviets began to challenge Western interests in earnest on a
global scale and mounted their drive for military superiority over the United States."
64. Supra note 28.
65. See J. WILczYNS1U, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EAST-WEST TRADE § 12, at 288
(1969).
66. Acting pursuant to his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. IIl 1978)),
President Carter, on November 14, 1979, issued Executive Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg.
65,729 (1979) to freeze Iranian assets in the United States. In a statement accompanying the
order, the White House said the freeze was "in response to reports that the Government of
Iran [was] about to withdraw its funds" from American banks and transfer them to friendlier
countries. 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2117 (Nov. 14, 1979).
67. See FACTS ON FILE 28 (1981).
68. See East- West Trade: Hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 169 Before the Subcommr. on Inter-
national Finance ofthe Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1325
n.l (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings Before the Subcomn on International Finance].
69. Supra note 40.
70. Id.
71. See Id.
72. On September 29, 1982, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a revised version of a
bill to rescind trade sanctions imposed by President Reagan on sales of U.S.-developed tech-
nology for use in the Soviet-Western European gas pipeline. Earlier that month, the U.S.
government reduced the scope of sanctions already imposed on several companies. FACTS
ON FILE 716 (1982). See supra note 41.
73. Id. Japanese Premier Zenko Suzuki on April 28 voiced doubt about the wisdom of President
Reagan's ending the U.S. embargo when he said: "Frankly speaking I was somewhat per-
plexed by the timing." He also complained that the U.S. had not sufficiently consulted with
Japan and explained its decision before announcing it. Economic sanctions adopted by Ja-
pan against the Soviet Union, in cooperation with the U.S. grain embargo would be reexam-
ined, Suzuki said. See also Hearings on Western Europe, supra note 14.
74. Suspension of U.S. Exports of High Technology and Grain to the Soviet Union: Hearings
Journal of Legislation
supports and storage costs became necessary.75 Embargoes, including
the extraterritorial pipeline sanctions, feed the world's impression that
the United States is an impulsive and unreliable supplier of goods and
services.76 Increasingly, nations come to the United States for the
purchase of food and other goods and services only as a last resort.
The Japanese are reluctant to enter long-term contracts for the
purchase of coal,7 7 having previously experienced difficulty in ob-
taining soybeans.78 Eastern Europeans and other Soviet allies are pres-
sured to avoid United States products. American companies escape the
caprice of American foreign policy by locating plants overseas. 79 The
extraterritorial pipeline sanctions notwithstanding, they avoid embar-
goes by manufacturing with foreign source materials and foreign sub-
sidiaries.8" Embargoes against exports of United States goods produce
exports of United States jobs and capital.8 ' The economic conse-
quences of such sanctions are difficult to quantify. 2 But they include
inflation, economic stagnation, and unemployment.83 They include na-
tional insecurity. The object of the sanctions remains unmoved and
largely undisturbed.
The Soviets respond by devoting resources to the development of
their own capabilities.84 Deny them equipment for the production of
industrial diamonds and they become the world's largest producer of
Before the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 76
(1980) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking].
75. Shipments of Agricultural Commodities to the Soviet Union, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
186 (Jan. 22, 1980).
76. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, supra note 61, at 509,
(testimony of Carl E. Bagge, President, National Coal Ass'n). See also Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking, supra note 74, at 50 (statement of Ray Schaub, Vice President, Legisla-
tive Affairs, National Corn Growers Ass'n). Mr. Schaub states, "Even the lifting of the cur-
rent embargo will not repair the damage to the reputation of the United States as a reliable
commodity trading partner with the Soviet Union and many other countries as well."
77. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COAL EXPORTS AND PORT DEVELOP-
MENT, A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 17 (1981).
78. See Economic Issues Between the United States, Japan and South Korea: Hearing Before the
Subcomm on Asian and Pacfe Adffairs of the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 5 (1974) (statement of Lester E. Edmond, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State). Mr. Edmond states, "Japan is concerned
about the reliability of the United States as a supplier of such products as feed grains, soy-
beans .. " See also K. SATO, JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE WORLD MATERIALS CRISIS, THE
CRISIS IN WORLD MATERIALS, A U.S.-JAPANESE SYMPosIuM 23 (1975).
79. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Foreign Commerce and Tourism, supra note 61, at 517
(statement of Daniel L. Goldy, President, International Systems and Controls Corp.).
80. Id. at 527.
81. See generally PROGRAM COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT, U.S.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY (1972). "The multinational cor-
poration gives away America's comparative advantage by transferring abroad those distinc-
tive assets that have made us competitive in the past-abundant capital, a high level of
technology, and efficient and dynamic management.... [T]he U.S. multinational corpora-
tion pursues its worldwide profits at the cost of a loss of jobs for American workers." To the
degree that American foreign trade embargoes cause corporations to establish subsidiaries
abroad, they also cause the export of United States capital and jobs.
82. Id.
83. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 65, at 288.
84. Id. at 286.
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industrial diamonds. 5 Deprived of gas turbines, they will build them.
The Soviets generally divert resources from lower economic priorities
and redouble their efforts to produce whatever is denied them. 6 They
are already the world's largest oil producer.87 The denial of equipment
for the production of oil or transportation of gas, if successful, would
increase energy prices over time. Consumers, including the United
States, would suffer. The Soviet Union's oil, gas, and gold would in-
crease in value. Dependence upon undependable Middle East sources
would be extended; gas supplies in the North Sea depleted prema-
turely. The Soviet Union is one of the world's best credit risks.88 It can
obtain financing and supply its requirements for energy equipment
from external or internal sources.8 9 It has the financial resources, and
there is virtually nothing now which cannot be bought from other
sources, including energy technology.90 The energy production com-
modity in greatest demand by the Soviet Union is large-diameter pipe-
line which is not made in the United States.9' The effect of these
sanctions is not so much to retard energy development or punish the
U.S.S.R.-as to punish and embarass the United States.
Embargoes are difficult to enforce.92 Even the COCOM System,
which has the support of our allies, has not always been effective as a
means of controlling exports to the Soviet Union of high technology
with military potentials.93 Wheat, corn, and soybeans, unlike com-
puters, are not identified by source. Trans-shipments and substitutions
of shipments are possible in violation of regulations and promises.94
Other nations do not share our enthusiasm for depriving themselves of
trade.95 They are hard pressed to export. They do not share the full
extent of our moral indignation, or our conviction that embargoes are
85. Industrial Diamond Association of America, Inc., Proceedings: The Industrial Diamond
Revolution, A Technical Conference (1968).
86. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 65, at 286.
87. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 97TH CONG., 2D SESs., TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET
ENERGY AVAILABILITY 19 (1981).
88. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE
46 (1979).
89. See supra note 87, at 172-173. The Soviet Union imports energy equipment from Japan,
West Germany, France, Italy, and the U.S.
90. Review of Implementation of Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comrm on Foreign Affairs
and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35-36
(1980) (statement of James H. Giffen, President, Armco International, Inc.); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. (1981).
91. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 87, at 17-18.
92. Hearings Before the Comm on Banking, supra note 74, at 65 (statement of B.J. O'Dowd,
President, AGRI Industries).
93. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 65, at 288.
94. Hearings Before the Comm, on Banking supra note 74, at 71 (statement of Sen. John G.
Tower, R-Tex.).
95. Hearings Before the Subconm. on Europe and the Middle East, supra, note 36, at 88 (state-




an effective means of bringing Soviet imperialism to heel.96 They often
give lip service to our efforts, agree to more "studies," and go on doing
business with the Soviets, picking up our business.
AN EFFECTIVE EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY
In the continuing competition between the United States and the
U.S.S.R., it would be wise to act with more predictability and some
respect for our economic interests. It would be best if our actions were
governed by a clearer perception of Soviet interests. That strategy must
maintain the economic strength of the nation, its social cohesion, and
the ideals which differentiate the United States and the Soviet Union.
It should include an appropriate use of all our resources for our polit-
ical purposes.
The United States has potentially more control over world food
supplies than Saudi Arabia has over oil, but we have never moved to
use that power effectively. 97 The Soviet Union is doomed to depen-
dence on external sources of grain. But, irrespective of Soviet provoca-
tion, the United States should develop a food policy for an era of
chronic poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and political instability, a food
policy more promising than a combination of expensive price supports,
intermittent embargoes and the stealthy purchase of United States
grain on advantageous terms by unfriendly nations. Other nations,
both producers and consumers, lacking the luxury of large surpluses
and internal markets, have public agencies to manage the marketing of
grain.
98
In lieu of embargoes, we could make the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration (C.C.C.) the exclusive agent for the sale of United States com-
modities to the Soviet Union and other nations against which we feel
bound to act. In this hungry and dangerous world, the United States
disarms itself uniquely and unilaterally by leaving the sale of American
food to multinational traders and their foreign government customers.
The C.C.C. could have taken over the grain stocks destined for the So-
viet Union, scaled down the sales step by step, making it clear that the
ultimate result could be an embargo. The policy could have been car-
ried out, giving both the markets and the Soviets time to adjust to the
carrot, as well as the stick. Other grain exporting nations have the
means and incentives to cooperate with such a policy. Profits on the
sale of food might be increased on sales to the Soviet Union, even as
political interests are brought into play. Such a mechanism offers a
96. Id.
97. Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, supra note 74, at 74 (statement by Sen. J. James
Exon, D-Neb.). Senator Exon urged the Committee on Banking to recognize food as a very
important and legitimate economic weapon and as one to be used with caution. To utilize
food as an economic weapon, the government would have to take steps to protect the food
producer. Elimination of embargoes, the Senator stated, is "a step in the right direction."
98. Hearings Before the Subcomm on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, supra note 61, at 529
(statement of Daniel L. Goldy, President, International Systems and Controls Corp.).
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means of demonstrating the rewards to be achieved by responsible be-
havior at the same time the United States demonstrates that aggression
has its price.
The Russians also need our technology.99 The United States and its
allies should agree on the technologies which are critical to Soviet eco-
nomic and military development and through the COCOM mecha-
nism," agree on which to embargo.10' They should also agree on
clear-cut terms of trade, including the credits to be extended to the So-
viet Union and its allies and the enforcement of those agreements, al-
ways leaving open the possibility of more credits and trade as relations
improve. We need to construct incentives to good behavior, as well as
disincentives to hostile behavior.
After World War II, United States leadership helped forge the in-
ternational institutions of trade and finance which gave the world a
measure of peace and prosperity."0 2 Today those institutions are in dis-
repair, and the United States is not in the preeminent position it occu-
pied in the late 1940's and 1950's.1°3 Cooperation with the other
industrial nations is essential now."° We lack the authority for unilat-
eral action and they resent the shocks and bumps of mercurial Ameri-
can policy. They fear the expediencies of American politics.'0 5
We must cooperate with our allies and pick up where Bretton
Woods left off.'0 6 Cooperation means sharing the economic aid burden
and, in the process, enjoying the economic benefits of expanded trade
and investment in the lesser developed and non-market countries.10 7 It
means responsibility for exchange rate stabilization, payments financ-
ing, and long-term development, bilaterally and through multilateral
banks and the International Monetary Fund. We can supply manage-
ment for the development of Least Developed Countries' economies
and help in building a scientific infrastructure for nations which at
present have no means of developing technologies relevant to their
needs. The United States can supply food to keep the hungry from
99. Brady, supra note 4, at 58.
100. See su~pra note 22.
101. Supra note 4, at 58-59. See also Hearings Before the Subcomar on International Finance,
supra note 10, at 1015 (statement by William Blackie, President, Caterpillar Tractor Co.).
102. See THE U.S. ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE
96TH CONGRESS, A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COM-
MITTEE 649-650 (1979) (essay by Richard E. Kaufman, Assistant Director-General Counsel,
Joint Economic Committee). See also id. at 7 (overview by Alfred Reifman).
103. See id. at 652. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 88, at 160-70.
104. See supra, note 102, at 22 (overview by Alfred Reifman).
105. Id. at 13.
106. At the Bretton Woods Conference, July 1 through the 22, 1944, the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were established.
International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.S. No. 1501; International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.S. No. 1502.
The IRBD is an organization for long-term lending, but not for other traditional banking
activities. Monetary co-operation falls within the domain of the IMF. With the exception of
the Soviet Union and most Eastern European nations, most nations are members of the IMF.
See MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 611 (M. Sorensen, ed. 1968).
107. See id. at 650 (essay by Richard E. Kaufman).
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dying and restore its image as a humane and powerful nation. We
could cooperatively develop the world's fuel supplies and maintain
stockpiles of industrial materials against the risk of interrupted supplies
from undependable foreign sources. These are the kind of hard an-
swers to which we once were equal and can be again. There are no
short cuts to prosperity or security in east-west trade, which may be
why the dilemmas remain unresolved-and the nation is left without a
coherent policy.
If the world does not break out of the well-worn ruts of endless
arms buildup and economic warfare, those ruts will lead again to con-
ffict and exhaustion in times more dangerous than any before. The
United States needs to pick up where it left off. Its ideals are in line
with the world's aspirations. Its resources are in line with the world's
needs.
